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THE

I. INTRODUCTION

modem lawyer has added an economist to the staff of experts
in his retinue. In the field of labor law, this new attendant has
helped to uproot many an old weed and to reset the perennials
in a new landscape. The joint efforts of lawyers and economists have been
planted in the rows of court briefs and their blooming into judicial decisions has gone unnoticed. It is with the purpose of letting the sun in
upon those plants that this article has been written.
In order to obtain a comprehensive review of the manner in which economic data have been treated in the historic sequence of labor cases, the
writer has examined the briefs of counsel submitted to the United States
Supreme Court in approximately sixty cases involving labor activities and
labor laws.' In some instances, it has also been possible to read records
of the oral arguments before the court. The alignment of issues and the
utilization of economic data in these briefs have been compared with the
reasoning of the courts, and a summary of the more obvious interactions
is presented below.
In a sense, all of the evidence introduced at the trial of a labor case is
economic data because every labor dispute is an economic phenomenon.
Some distinction might be made between historical, psychological, biological and economic facts presented in the trial testimony; but they all
relate to an economic situation. For the purposes of this article, we have
regarded such facts, alleged in the declaration or the complaint, without
differentiation, as the narrative facts. They are the facts presented in a
case because it is necessary to narrate and prove some facts to maintain
a cause of action; they happen to be economic in these cases merely because the field of legal action is economic. This study, however, has been
directed toward the economic data which may or may not be introduced
within the discretion of the parties, but which are voluntarily presented
as a means of assisting the courts in understanding, interpreting, or
* Senior Attorney, United States Department of Labor.

' The writer is indebted to Samuel Barker, an attorney in the United States Department
of Labor, for his assistance in the examination of these voluminous briefs.
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evaluating the narrative facts. The former might be called interpretative
facts or, as they have been commonly labelled, economic data.
The writer has been interested, not only in the use of interpretative
facts, but also in the use of economic references, economic authorities
and economic theories. The references may be cited as authorities or
cited for whatever additional interpretative facts they may contain. The
authorities may be quoted to illustrate the wisdom of an opinion or to
demonstrate that a certain idea is common knowledge. The economic
theories may be expounded or advocated as inherent in the law or as aids
to the proper application of the law. These differences in the character
of the material or the technique of handling the material will appear in
the course of this article.
The cases considered are discussed herein under the subject headings
of (i) Labor's Aggressive Activities-Restraint of Trade, Strikes, Boycotts and Picketing; (2) Labor's Bargaining Activities-Yellow Dog Contracts and Collective Bargaining; (3) Labor Legislation-Hours, Child
Labor, and Minimum Wages. Within each subdivision an attempt is
made to follow the cases in their chronological order. This review is confined to United States Supreme Court decisions and there is no pretense
to a summary of all the principles of labor law; but in order to observe
the significance of the economic data discussed, a brief introductory statement of the Supreme Court decisions is given under each heading, and
after the use of economic data is presented, a slight excursion is made into
related problems likely to come before the Supreme Court.
II.

IA-BOR'S AGGR.ESSIVE ACTIVITIES
I.

RESTRAINT OF TRADE

The early judicial attitudes toward the activities of organized labor
underwent some alteration even before the United States Supreme Court
had occasion to rule upon them. The doctrine of criminal conspiracy in
its all embracing form, by which all combinations of workers to affect the
terms of their employment were deemed criminal, was laid to rest by the
lower courts. The declarations on the subject by the United States Supreme Court were in explanation of the modem rule, that what one may
do singly, he may do in concert with others as long as both his purpose
and methods are lawful. The lower courts had already recognized the
complex and impersonal character of modern employment for which they
needed new legal theories. But their reliance upon legal theory or upon
limited personal observation led to their formulation of new theories of
law by which they frequently reached the same result which they had
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previously attained. The new doctrine of malice and just cause became
new premises upon which opinions might be evolved with or without attention to the social circumstances of the cases-with varying and inconsistent results.
The United States Supreme Court commenced its series of labor
decisions in a world of legal rule and reason which had already developed
these definite theoretical premises and abstract techniques of application.
In this atmosphere, the first group of labor cases to arise were those
brought under the anti-trust laws. The Sherman Act2 provided that every
combination in restraint of trade was unlawful. Under that act and the
amendments known as the Clayton Act, 3 strikes and boycotts of labor
organizations were made the subject of injunctions and judgments for
treble damages.
The Sherman Act was first applied by the United States Supreme Court
in a labor dispute in the Danbury Hatters' case. 4 In that case and in the
Bucks Stove and Range case, s the Court found that secondary boycotts used
with the intention of curtailing the interstate trade of nonunion firms
were in violation of the law. The agitation against these and other court
decisions restricting the aggressive activities of labor organizations
culminated in the adoption of the Clayton Act. That act, incorporating
the rubric that the labor of human beings is not a commodity, was
heralded by organized labor as its liberation from the Sherman law. The
Supreme Court, however, in the Duplex case 6 held that the Clayton Act
did not exempt labor organizations from the anti-trust law and did not
legalize the secondary boycott. The next few labor decisions under the
anti-trust acts differentiated between proximate and remote interferences
with interstate commerce. In the first Coronado Coal Co. case, 7 a strike
to unionize a mining area was held local, indirect and too remote, but
upon a retrial of the case and upon the introduction of new evidence connecting the strike with an intent to preserve the union organization in
competitive fields, the Court found an immediate and proximate restraint
upon interstate commerce 8 In the United Leather Workers case, 9 the
2 26

Stat.

209

(i8go),

i

U.S.C.A. § i

(1927).

338 Stat. 730 (1914), i5 U.S.C.A. §§ 12, 17, 26 (1927); 38 Stat. 737
§ 381 (1928).
4Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (i9o8).
s Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (19i1).
6 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).

(1914), 28

U.S.C.A.

7United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
8 Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925).

9United Leather Workers Internatl Union v. Herkert and Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S.
457 (1924).
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Court found another strike limited to local restraints.,, The final labor
case of importance which arose under the anti-trust laws was the Bedford
Cut Stone case," in which the majority court found a boycott essentially
the same as in the Duplex case, but in which Justice Brandeis (joined by
Justice Holmes in a dissent) sought to demonstrate the reasonableness
of the strike and boycott in that case and endeavored thereby to exclude
them from the operation of the Sherman Act."1 In time, the threat of this
rule of reason and the increasing availability of injunctions as a legal
method of combating organized labor have tended to eliminate proceedings based upon the Sherman and Clayton acts, but these cases remain
to illustrate how the realities of economic life were considered or disre3
garded in labor cases.'
The early boycott cases.-The economic issues in these cases were argued
and decided without a deliberate use of economic data. 14 They all raised
the question whether acts performed before or after the shipment of
goods, with no physical obstruction to the movement of goods, could be a
1oThe law was next applied to the labor relations activities of employers' associations.
In the case of United States v. Brims, 272 U.S. 549 (1926), an agreement among manufacturers
and contractors to employ only union carpenters and not to install millwork produced under
non-union conditions was held a criminal violation of the Sherman Act. In the case of Industrial Ass'n of San Francisco v. United States, 268 U.S. 64 (1925), a combination to refuse to
sell building materials produced in California to those contractors of San Francisco who refused to operate on the open shop plan was held not to restrain interstate commerce. In the
case of Anderson v. Shipowners' Ass'n, 272 U.S. 359 (1926), the court upheld the sufficiency
of a complaint alleging that a shipowners' association operated a marine service bureau
through which members were required to obtain labor and through which workers were compelled to accept employment at fixed wages. These decisions applied the same reasoning to
employers' associations as had been applied to the labor organizations.
11Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927).
12 Id. at 56-65.
13In these cases, the Court ruled upon numerous questions of law such as the intention of
Congress to include labor organizations under the Sherman Act, the meaning of restraint of
trade, the nature of interstate commerce, the extent to which Congress intended by the Clayton Act to exempt labor organizations from the anti-trust law or from the power of the courts
to grant injunctions, the intent required for restraint of trade under the law and the applicability of the law to reasonable restraints. It is not the purpose of this article to review the holdings of the Court on these questions. In the course of deciding these points of law, the Court
made certain determinations of fact and was guided by certain general appraisals of economic
conditions. Also in applying the general doctrines, the Court rested upon certain findings of
fact. Frequently, one rule of law or another could have been invoked, with contrary results,
depending upon how the Court envisaged the facts of the case. It is with those situations and
the actual or possible use of economic data that the writer has been concerned. Consequently,
the following remarks concerning the restraint of trade cases do not purport to exhaust the
issues involved, but relate only to the use of interpretative economic material in those cases.
'4 See Briefs in Case No. 389, Oct. Term 19o7; Appellant's Brief in Case No. 45, Oct. Term
192o, at 38-46, 138-48, 150-52; Appellee's Brief in Case No. 45, Oct. Term I92o, at I5-17.
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restraint of interstate commerce. Purely as a matter of statutory construction, the court decided that such conduct was actionable when it involved an intent to restrain interstate commerce. Although few, if any,
interpretative facts were presented, the court had no hesitation in finding
such an intent in the cases before it. The popular issue of whether the
Clayton Act was designed to free labor organizations from the Sherman
Act was treated as a psychological problem of Congressional intent with
little recognition of the labor conflict involved. So the exemption of labor
unions from the injunctive process was limited to disputes between an
employer and his immediate employees without a discussion of the facts
of the employment situation. The relationships between the parties and
the strangers to the boycotts were discussed only in general terms, and
the legal concepts of coercion and liberty prevailed.
The Coronado Coal Co. cases.-These cases, involving essentially the
same narrative facts, illustrate well the effectiveness of economic data.
In the first case, the record' disclosed the basic facts.
The manager of the Bache-Denman Mines decided to change from union to open
shop operation. Guards were hired and armed. One mine was surrounded with cable
entanglements. Some of the mines were dosed in order to reopen non-union. The district organization of the workers called a strike. A delegation to the superintendent
was followed by a crowd which rioted, injured the guards, and destroyed property.
At another mine later, there was a gun battle, the mine was dynamited and destroyed
and two guards were taken out and murdered.
The Court found an intention to preverit the operation of the mines with
non-union labor but no intention to affect interstate commerce. The
strike was said to be local in origin, motive, waging and felonious ending.
At the trial of the second case, however, the company introduced new
evidence.,6
In convention proceedings and private discussion, union leaders stressed the danger
of non-union competition from Southern Colorado, Alabama and Tennessee to the
union agreements in Arkansas, Oklahoma and Texas, and the determination of the
unionists to prevent the shipment of coal from the open shop Coronado mines in
competition with union mines. The potential output in the Coronado mines was more
fully established as 5ooo tons a day instead of 5ooo tons a week, as previously assumed; and the possibility of cheaper production and lower prices was proved, in
order to show what the union really feared.
In their briefs,"7 the company's attorneys took full advantage of the
general economic background in the case. They emphasized the potential
I See Record and Briefs in Case No. 31, Oct. Terni 1919.
See Record and Briefs in Case No. 671, Oct. Term 1924.

16

17 See Brief

for P1. in Error in Case No. 671, Oct. Term

1924,

at

2r, 22, 50, 54

and Appendix.
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production of the plaintiff's mines and its possible influence upon the price
of coal in the competitive market. In order to remove all doubt about
their ability to undersell union mines, they tabulated in an appendix the
reasons given by their expert witnesses for the cheaper production of coal
in open shop mines. Then they argued the general policy of the union to
increase the price of coal in one area to protect union operators elsewhere
and they inferred an intention to restrain interstate commerce in this
case because of the importance to the union of preventing the plaintiff's
open shop operations and shipments in interstate commerce. They even
recognized that the doctrine of restraint of trade might be limited by the
reasonableness of the restraint, and they argued that the commission of
crimes to damage a competitor could not be considered reasonable. The
attorneys for the Coronado Company presented a convincing argument
because of their accumulation of new evidence showing the economic
circumstances surrounding the parties.
The union's brief 8 attempted to show that the workers' acts were concerned with the purely local matters of personal self-defense and the
preservation of the company's union agreement, but the reality of the
union's interest in protecting its organization throughout the coal areas
of the United States was too stark to conceal.
The Supreme Court overruled portions of the lower court decisions on
the basis of the economic data in the case. The new evidence of the threat
to unionization across state lines and of the recognition and discussion
of it by the union officials was deemed sufficient to require the submission
of the question of the union's intention to a jury. The Supreme Court held
that the mere reduction in the supply of coal to be shipped in interstate
commerce, even by tortious or criminal conduct, would ordinarily be too
remote and indirect to constitute a restraint upon interstate commerce,
but the addition of an intent to control the supply entering and moving in
interstate commerce or to control the price of coal in interstate markets,
in order to protect union producers, would make the action of the local
union officials a direct violation of the anti-trust act. The Court's conclusion that there was sufficient evidence of such an intent to warrant a
new trial was made possible by the powerful factual presentation of the
company's case.19
Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stonecutters Ass'n of N.A.2°--In
this case, the minority decision of justice Brandeis, without aid of
counsel, demonstrated to what end economic data might be directed in
is See Brief for Def. in Error in Case No. 671, Oct. Term 1924.
19 See Brief for P1. in Error in Case No. 671, Oct. Term 1924.

20

274 U.S. 37, 56

(1927).
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restraint of trade cases. The briefs2l of both sides were devoid of interpretative facts. The majority court found that the union, by resolving not
to finish the cutting of any stone started by non-union men, and by inducing strikes thereon upon distant jobs, conducted a secondary boycott
with an intent to interfere with interstate commerce. 22 Justice Brandeis
built an imposing minority opinion by restating the evidence and by
extracting from it economic implications calculated to bring the case
within the scope of the legal principle that the Sherman Anti-Trust Law
did not prohibit reasonable restraints of trade.
He observed that the plaintiffs were not isolated weak employers but
the producers of seventy per cent of the cut stone shipped in the interstate commerce of the country. They were organized in a local employers'
association and affiliated with a national cut stone association. On the
other hand, the defendants' organization had only 150 locals averaging
thirty-three members each and its strength depended upon the combination and loyalty of all of its 5,ooo members dispersed throughout the
country. The conflict was made to appear one between organizations of
employers and employees necessarily national in scope. justice Brandeis
differentiated this case from the other restraint of trade cases by stressing
the fact that the workers here endeavored merely to have the members of
their own craft and organization refuse to finish products started by opponents of their organization. They sought no action by outsiders and no
boycott of outside dealers or contracts; nor did they engage in any unlawful trespasses, breaches of contract, violence, intimidation, fraud, or
threats. Upon these facts, he concluded that the case involved merely a
refusal to work against one's self-interest, in a struggle between an
organization of employees and an organization of employers within their
own trade, and that to deny such workers the right to cease work under
those circumstances reminded one of involuntary servitude. He rested
this view of the case upon a legal principle, namely, the limitation of the
Sherman Law to unreasonable restraints of trade, which was not disowned
by the majority court. The briefs of counsel were of practically no assistance in building this interpretation of the facts of the case, but Justice
Brandeis indicated clearly what use could have been made of economic
data in this case and per example what might be done in other cases.
The doctrine of restraint of trade is still the law.23 It has been little
2" See

Briefs in Case No.

412,

Oct. Term 1926.

22justices Sanford and Stone concurred because of the controlling effect of the earlier

Duplex decision.
23 United

racket.

States v. Local No. 167,

291

U.S. 293 (I934) applied the Sherman Act to a labor
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used in recent labor disputes because other legal weapons have been
found more valuable. Still, it influences many judicial decisions in the
subtle manner of pervading legal concepts and may at any time be offered
as the sole basis for determining a labor dispute. The existence of an intent to restrain interstate commerce may be decided as it was in the
second Coronado Coal Co. case by proof of the general economic background behind the activities of the parties. In defense, the rule of reason,
now firmly entrenched in the law of monopolies, may be urged with renewed vigor and the question of reasonableness may be decided or at
least influenced by economic data.
2.

STRIKES

The decisions of the Supreme Court under the Sherman and Clayton
acts passed upon the legality of strikes only in so far as they involved a
restraint upon interstate commerce. Whenever the court found such a
restraint, the strike, being part of the combination to accomplish that
restraint, was declared unlawful. There was no consideration of the strike
or the right to strike aside from the other activities of the workers. There
was a definite avoidance of the factual data submitted to demonstrate the
proper purposes of the strike. The majority court found that regardless
of the legality or illegality of the workers' conduct at common law, their
intent to restrain interstate commerce vitiated all of their joint acts under
the anti-trust laws. justice Brandeis, in his minority opinions in the
Duplex and Bedford cases, expressed dicta concerning the justification of
self-interest in strikes, but the majority opinions were silent on that
point.24 The restraint of trade cases, particularly if modified by the rule
of reason, have failed to establish any basic law of strikes.
Shortly before the Bedford decision, the United States Supreme Court
ruled upon the legality of a strike in the case of Dorchy v. Kansas.25 The
object of that strike was to recover an alleged deficiency in wages due one
of the union members who had been seeking to collect for over two years
and who had left his employment before the strike. The briefs26 of counsel
argued the constitutionality of the Kansas compulsory arbitration
statute and discussed the theories of the right to strike, but offered no
24 Nor may it be inferred from the fact that the court refused to take action against strikes
involving no intent to restrain interstate trade that the court upheld the legality of such
strikes, because in the absence of a violation of the federal anti-trust laws, the federal courts
may have had no jurisdiction to proceed any further.
2S 272

U.S.

306

(1926).

21See Briefs in Case No. ii9, Oct. Term 1926.
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interpretative data on the peculiar facts of this case. The Court found the
strike an unlawful substitute for a lawsuit and commented:
The right to carry on business-be it called liberty or property-has value. To
interfere with this right without just cause is unlawful. The fact that the injury was
inflicted by a strike is sometimes a justification. But a strike may be illegal because
of its purpose, however orderly the manner in which it is conducted. To collect a stale
claim due a fellow member of the union who was formerly employed in the business
is not a permissible purpose.n
The court concluded with a general statement to the effect that
"Neither the common law, nor the Fourteenth amendment confers the
absolute right to strike. '"2S The limitations upon this right mentioned in
the decision were the requirement of "just cause" and a "permissible purpose." Clearly such evaluations as "just cause" or "permissible purpose"
can be applied properly only upon a thorough understanding of the social
and economic implications of a particular strike. To convey such an understanding to a court, economic briefs may find considerable use.
To a certain extent, the National Labor Relations ActV9 has clarified
the "permissible purposes" of strikes by affirming the rights of workers to
organize, select representatives of their own choice, bargain collectively
and act concertedly for mutual aid and protection, with an express
stipulation that closed shop agreements between employers and the representatives of a majority of workers in an appropriate bargaining unit are
legal. Under this statute, the Supreme Court has already had occasion to
acknowledge the rights of workers in strikes for improvements in wages,
hours, and other conditions of employment, 30 for an opportunity to bargain collectively,3' for an all union shop,32 and for the reinstatement of
workers against whom the employer discriminated. 33 The use of economic
data in these cases is reviewed below. The real purpose of a strike must
still be proved and the significant circumstances will call for interpretative data.
3-BOYCOTTS
The restraint of trade decisions were a little more explicit on the legality
of boycotts than they were on strikes. Although the court repeatedly
27 272 U.S. 3o6, 311 (1926).
28Id. at 31i.
29 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § i
(1927).
30 Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 303 U.S. 453 (1938); N.L.R.B. v. Mackay
Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1939); N.L.R.B. v. Fansteel Mietallurgical Corp., 59
S. Ct. 490 (1939); N.L.R.B. v. Sands Manufacturing Co., 59 S. Ct. 508 (1939).
31 Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 3o3 U.S. 453 (1938).
3: N.L.R.B. v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 59 S. Ct. 5Or ('939).
33 N.L.R.B. v. Sands Manufacturing Co., 59 S. Ct. 5o8 (.939).
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stated that the applicability of the anti-trust laws depended upon the intent to restrain interstate commerce and not upon the legality or illegality
of boycotts under the common law, the court took occasion to note that
the cases involved secondary boycotts unlawful in the states where they
occurred and that the Sherman and Clayton Acts did not legalize secondary boycotts.
In the Duplex case, the employers' brief 34 argued that a boycott was a
conspiracy depriving the public-an innocent party-of its sovereign
right of choice over commodities and therefore, unlike a strike, it was not
an ordinary effort of a labor organization to improve its conditions of employment. The majority court construed the Clayton Act as protecting
organized labor only in its lawful pursuits and the court found no congres36
sional intent to legalize the secondary boycott.-3 The minority court
declared that the union boycott was not unlawful at the common law because it was in the workers' self-interest. Just as strikes and the refusal
to handle non-union materials had been justified, so this boycott by the
employees of unionized firms against a non-union competitor should be
justified as a competitive injury inflicted in their self-interest.
In the Bedford case, the majority court found a secondary boycott like
that in the Duplex case and held it also a restraint of trade. 37 Though
counsel for the union offered no interpretative data, 38 Justice Brandeis
insisted that the union members sought no action by outsiders, no boycott of outside dealers or contractors and that surely in such a case the
self-interest of the unionists justified their conduct. 39
Although these decisions have been cited frequently to indicate that the
United States Supreme Court has held secondary boycotts unlawful, they
hold at most that when a secondary boycott is deemed unlawful in the
state in which it occurs, it will not be regarded as lawful by the Supreme
Court, and when it is accompanied by an intention to restrain interstate
commerce in violation of the anti-trust laws, it will be held an unlawful
combination in restraint of trade. The many problems connected with
the law of boycotts such as whether other union members, public sympathizers or consumers may instigate the boycott, whether other products
of an "unfair" employer or politically undesirable goods may be boy34 See Appellant's Brief in Case No. 45, Oct. Term 1920.
3s Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
36Id. at 479-88.

Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927).
See Brief for Union in Case No. 412, Oct. Term 1926.
39 Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37, 59 (1927).
37
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cotted, and whether newspaper advertisers, remote retailers or ultimate
consumers may be boycotted have not been settled by state courts. In
keeping with recent trends in labor law, even the attitude toward secondary boycotts is undergoing a change in many states. 40 In this uncertain
and shifting field of law, economic data may play a determinative role.
4. PICKETING

The Supreme Court decisions on picketing have been much more direct
than those on boycotts. In the American Steel Foundries case, 4' the court
proceeded cautiously to define the nature of proper and improper conduct. It denounced the obvious acts of assault and disapproved of the
intimidation resulting from the presence of large numbers after such acts.
Avoiding the use of the term picketing, it permitted the patrol of each
place of ingress and egress by one representative of the workers who might
seek to persuade without coercion. On the same day on which that case
was decided, the Court, in the Truax case, 42 found that if the courts of
Arizona refused to grant an injunction against picketing with libelous
signs and intimidatory remarks because of a state law43 limiting injunctions in labor disputes, that law was unconstitutional. Picketing by illegal means, even though peaceful, could not be sheltered from the injunctive process of the courts.
Several years later, Congress adopted the Norris-LaGuardia Act 44 prohibiting the issuance of injunctions against an enumerated list of peaceful
activities in labor disputes. Many states enacted laws patterned after
this and in the Senn case, 45 the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Wisconsin statute. 46 That case involved the peaceful picketing of a tile
setting contractor, by persons not his employees, for the purpose of inducing him to sign an agreement to unionize his shop and to refrain from
working as a tile setter himself. In the Lauf case,47 the Court held that the
picketing of a company's grocery and meat markets by a union, embracing
none of the company's employees, for the purpose of obtaining recognition
and collective bargaining was peaceful conduct in a labor dispute protected by both federal and state acts from injunctive restraint. This time
a minority court dissented 4l on the interpretation of a labor dispute
40 6 Internat'l Jurididal Ass'n Bull., Secondary Boycotts in Labor Disputes, § 7 at 83.

4z American Steel Foundries Co. v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. r84 (1921).
42

Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S.

44 47

Stat.

72 (1932), 29

312 (1921).

43

Ariz. Rev. Stat. 1913,

U.S.C.A. § ioi (Supp. 1938).

4sSenn v. Tile Layers Protective Union Local No. 5, 301 U.S. 468 (1936).
46Wis. L. 1931, c. 376; Wis. L. I935, c. 551.

47Lauf v. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938).

48I.

at 331.

1164.
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under the acts and insisted that an injunction should lie against what appeared to it to be fraudulent, intimidatory and coercive conduct of
strangers to the employer-employee relationship. The majority court,
however, again placed a liberal construction upon the term "labor dis-

49
pute" under the Norris-LaGuardia Act in the New Negro Alliance case.

It reversed an injunction against the peaceful picketing of a grocery company by a civic organization of Negroes, which organization included
none of the company's employees and which organization sought to induce the company to engage Negroes as clerks instead of merely as
menials. Despite a minority opinion which regarded such picketing as
"mobbish interference" with individual liberty,o the right to picket
peacefully and to be free therein from the injunctive control of federal and
certain state courts seems firmly established. The presence or absence of
economic data in these cases presents many suggestions for the use of such
material in similar situations.
American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council; Truax v.
Corrigan.-Inneither of these cases did the briefs of counsel offer economic data.sx They urged the adoption of certain economic and legal
convictions such as that all picketing is a nuisance, that labor discontent
must express itself in either picketing or anarchy, that all peaceful
activities of labor organizations should be lawful, that property in the
good will of a business does not deserve the absolute protection given
tangible property, that free speech and publication are more sacred than
the right to conduct business and that pickets should have the same immunities as commercial competitors of the employer. In so far as any
authorities were cited in support of these subjective evaluations, they
were judicial decisions and not the studies or condusions of economists.
That may help explain why the court limited picketing so unrealistically
to one missionary at each place of ingress and egress, and insisted upon
preserving the injunctive power of the courts over peaceful picketing.
Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union.-The briefs2 of counsel for Senn
consisted of a legal argument on the deprivation of his property without
due process of law and the denial of equal protection of the law. The
brief53 of counsel for the union, however, supplemented its legal argument
with an extensive discussion of the economic relationship of the parties.
It alluded to narrative and interpretative facts submitted in evidence at
49 New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 3o3 U.S. 552 (z938).
10 Id. at 563-4.
s, See Briefs in Case No. 2, Oct. Term 1921; Briefs in Case No. 13, Oct. Term 1921.
"2See Brief for P1. in Error in Case No. 658, Oct. Term 1936.

S3See Brief for Def. in Error in Case No. 658, Oct. Term 1936.
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the trial of the case and upon them it elaborated the following economic
discourse. just as it was to the interest of the union to displace nonunion men with union men, it was to their interest to prevent a contractor
from plying the trade of a tilesetter himself. A contractor working with
the tools of his trade may underbid those who do not do so and thereby
undermine the business and the wages of the union contractors. The rule
against such work was also necessary to prevent a resort to the subterfuge
of a partnership between employer and employee, a practice which would
bring destruction to the unions and demoralization to the industry. Even
independently of the proposed agreement, the contractor would not be
permitted to work himself because he had never served an apprenticeship
and was not a qualified craftsman, which requirements had long been
recognized as legitimate. The union sought to enforce these rules merely
by peaceful picketing which was a lawful form of appeal to the public not
to patronize the contractor; the contractor was free to use all lawful
means at his command to convince the public to trade with him as a nonunion contractor; and the public was free to accept or reject either appeal. Their dispute was just a legitimate economic conflict for employment or trade on conditions suitable to the economically dominant person. The brief tried to bolster this argument with a large number of legal
citations on incidental points; but it spun the cloth from threads of fact
and theory not found in legal doctrine.
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court accepted the theories
and argument of the brief and embodied them in its decision. It acknowledged as conclusive the finding of the state Supreme Court that the case
involved a labor dispute under the state act. It held that peaceful picketing, permitted by the state law, was not a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment; nor was the union rule requiring Senn to abstain from working as a tile setter. The Supreme Court quoted the state court's finding
that the rule was adopted by the defendants out of the necessities of employment within the industry and for the protection of themselves as
workers and craftsmen in the industry. "That finding," it held, "is amply
supported by the evidence."" The Court went further to declare that
"nothing in the federal constitution forbids unions from competing with
non-union concerns for customers by means of picketing as freely as one
merchant competes with another by means of advertisements in the press,
by circulars, or by his window display." ss This was a new application
of the doctrine of laissez faire in labor cases.
S4 Senn

v. Tile Layers Protective Union Local No. 5,3o U.S. 468, 480 (1936).

5sId. at 481.
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Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co.-Counsel for the union in this case depended so much upon the Senn decision that they presented no interpretative data.56 Opposing counsel sought either to differentiate the two
cases on logical grounds or to have the doctrine of the Senn case modified.57 Similarly the majority and minority courts divided on differences
limited to the narrative facts and principles of law.
New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co.-The brief filed for the
New Negro Alliance urged upon the court the importance of considering
social and economic principles s8 Then it set forth data concerning the
economic plight of the Negro. These facts showed that Negroes were on
relief in greater proportion than Whites and were not being reabsorbed
into private industry at the same rate as the Whites, and that the Negro
was denied economic opportunities even in federal government employment where he was denied civil service priorities and confined to jobs in
the lower paid occupations. Since the Negro had no control over jobs
through the ownership of business, the brief argued he was compelled to
campaign through negotiations and picketing to obtain economic opportunities for members of his race from those concerns which depend
upon Negro patronage. Negotiations having proved fruitless in the instant case, peaceful picketing was indispensable. The brief for the company 9 ignored this argument and its supporting data and relied on the
plea that the dispute was a racial one rather than a labor dispute.
The majority court held that even a racial dispute, arising out of
discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment, was a labor dispute. The minority opinion found this construction "tortured" and surmised that now "no employer-merchant, manufacturer, builder, cobbler,
housekeeper or what not-who prefers helpers of one color or class can
find adequate safeguard against intolerable violations of his freedom."6 "
Although the majority court may have been influenced by the economic
s6

See Brief for P1. in Error in Case No. 293, Oct. Term 1937.

57 See

Brief for Def. in Error in Case No. 293, Oct. Term 1937.
ss "This case involves not only legal questions but complex socio-economic principles which
command the critical attention of all who believe that the law is really sovereign when it ripens
into social justice. 'An avalanche of decisions by tribunals great and small is producing a
situation where citation of precedent is tending to count for less, and appeal to an informing
principle is tending to count for more' (Cardozo, The Growth of the Law) ..... Comparative
study of the size, strength, financial resources, history, purpose, influence, and skill of each
contestant is essential. Differences within the economic and social areas should be considered
and decisions reached based upon these subtle, yet powerful considerations."-See Brief for
Pl. in Error in Case No. Sir, Oct. Term 1937.
59See Brief for Def. in Error in Case No. Sir, Oct. Term 1937.
60 New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938).

USE OF ECONOMIC DATA IN LABOR CASES

data presented by counsel, it failed to acknowledge it as vehemently as
the minority justices.
These cases have developed the law of picketing to a point at which
peaceful picketing seems assured an immunity from injunctive interference by federal and some state courts. There remain many problems unsettled. What constitutes peaceful picketing must always remain a question of fact. How many pickets may walk together, what sound devices
may they use to convey their message, where may the pickets patrol,
whom may they accost and what may they say, remain subject to interpretation under the general rules of fraud, intimidation and coercion.
That consumers may picket, was implied, but not expressly determined,
in the New Negro Alliance case. May picketing be directed against advertisers in allegedly "unfair" newspapers, against dealers in objectionable foreign goods, against exorbitant landlords, against political opponents? These and other problems to arise in new situations will be
settled by our courts only upon some interpretation of the social setting
in which they appear.
III. LABOR'S BARGAIN-ING ACTIVITIES
i.

ME RECORD OF LITIGATION

The early efforts of organized labor to bargain collectively were repulsed by many employers through the requirement that employees sign
an agreement promising not to become members of a labor organization.
To overcome this opposition, the trade unions succeeded in obtaining
several statutes against such "yellow dog contracts." In the Adair case,6
the Supreme Court declared a federal law z prohibiting anti-union employment contracts on interstate railroads unconstitutional as a curtailment of the liberty of contract. In the Coppage case,63 the majority court
64
applied the same reasoning and ruled a Kansas statute unconstitutional.
Justice Day dissented on the ground that this law expressly prohibited
coercive contracts and the determination of the state legislature and state
supreme court that coercion existed should not be overruled. 65 The majority court, however, went even one step further in the Hitclman Coal and
Coke Co. case,6 6 in which it protected a "yellow dog contract" by enjoining
6

Adair v. United States,

230

208 U.S. 16i (r9o8).
Stat. 424 (I898), repealed in 38 Stat. io8 (i9r3), 45 U.S.C.A. § 125 (1928).

63Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. x (1915).
64Kan. Gen. Stat. 1909, 4674-5.
6s Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. i, 27-42
6Hitchmaan

(1915).

Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell,

245

U.S.

229

(1917).
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a trade union from seeking to organize the workers who had executed the
contract.
In the face of these determinations and in response to the unrelenting
pressure of trade unions, Congress enacted the Railway Labor Act of
192667 which prohibited all employer interference in the organization of
employees on interstate railroads. This time, the Supreme Court, in the
Texas and New OrleansRailroad case, 6 .upheld the constitutionality of the
Act as a means of eliminating disputes likely to obstruct interstate commerce. The court sought to distinguish the Adair and Coppage cases by
glossing over the effect of the Railway Labor Act and holding that it did
not prevent the discharge of an employee. Later, in the VirginiaRailway
case,6 9 the court held that the Railway Act not only prohibited employer
interference in the repair shops, but also required an affirmative effort to
bargain with the union representatives of a majority of the employees.
Congress extended the rights of collective bargaining in the National
Labor Relations Act which expressly forbids discrimination in hiring, discharge or tenure of employment in order to induce an employee to join or
to refrain from joining a labor organization, forbids agreements having
the same effect and makes collective bargaining the duty of all employers
engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods affecting
interstate commerce. 70 The Supreme Court has sustained the constitutionality of this act as applied to businesses engaged in interstate commerce such as a motor bus line"y and a news service 7" and businesses affect-

ing interstate commerce such as a steel corporation,7 3 a clothing company,7 4 a producer of trailers 75 a public utility 76 and a fruit packing and
canning company.7 7 It has held unlawful and enjoined employer inter78
ference, coercion and restraint upon the self organization of employees
and employer domination and control of labor organizations.' 9 It has
6744 Stat. 577 (1925), 45 U.S.C.A. § I51 (Supp. 1938).
68
Texas & N. 0. Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
69 Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 5I (1937).
70

§§ 7 and 8 of the National Labor Relations Act.

7"Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. N.L.R.B., 3oi U.S. 142 (1937).
72 Associated

Press v. N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 103 (1937).

73N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I (1937).
74N.L.R.B. v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (X937).
7s N.L.R.B. v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937).
76 Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. N.L.R.B., 304 U.S. 555 (1939).
77Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v..N.L.R.B., 303 U.S. 453 (1938).
78See cases cited in notes 71-77 supra.
7s N.L.R.B. v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S.
vania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261 (1938).
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ordered employers to reinstate employees wrongfully discharged or discriminated against because of union activities8 ° and to disestablish company unions.8' It has protected the right of employees to designate rep8
sentatives of their own choice for the purposes of collective bargaining. 2
Without ever admittedly reversing the decisions in the Adair and Coppage
cases, the United States Supreme Court has arrived at an opposite conclusion-upholding a statute which affirmatively promotes union organization and collective bargaining. This transformation has come about
through a pronounced change in public information and political opinion, some of which was brought to the attention of the court as economic
data in the briefs presented to it.
2.

USE OF ECONOMIC DATA IN THE "YELLOW DOG" CONTRACT CASES

There was no effort to utilize economic data in these early cases. The
parties argued freely many economic assumptions and contentions; but
interpretative facts were not deemed necessary. In the Adair case, the
obstruction of interstate commerce by strikes was alleged and denied
without factual proof on either side.8 3 In the Coppage case, the economic
coercion arising out of the circumstances of employees seeking jobs was
discussed in the abstract. 84 In the Hitchman case there was considerable
argument to decide whether the union was seeking to enlarge its membership or seeking to call a strike and whether agreeing to join a union was
the same as joining it. The narrative facts of each case were evaluated
in relation to their general significance, but there was no aid sought from
authoritative research or expert opinion. 85 In such a situation the liberty
of the employee to contract on terms set by the employer was declared
the law.
3.

USE OF ECONOMIC DATA IN THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT CASES

These cases involved a little economic data, but no effort to stress its
use. The Texas and New OrleansRailroad case briefs86 quoted from legislative committee reports and from government studies of railroad strikes
to show the past experience of the railroads with voluntary standards;
and, upon that record, the court decided that the provisions of the 1926
Railway Labor Act were mandatory. The court conveniently ignored the
discharge of union officials and distinguished the Adair and Coppage cases
80 See cases cited in notes 71-75, 77 supra; also N.L.R.B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph
Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
81See cases cited in note
83See Briefs in Case No.
'4 See Briefs in Case No.
s See Briefs in Case No.

79 supra.
82 See cases cited in notes 76 and 79 supra.
293, Oct. Term 1907.
48, Oct. Term 194.
ii, Oct. Term 1917.

"See Briefs in Cases No. 469, Oct. Term 1929.
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on the basis that the Railway Labor Act in protecting unions from employer interference did not interfere with the normal exercise of the carriers' right to hire and fire, In the Virginian Railway case the effect of
"back shop" work upon interstate commerce was established by economic
data. The employer's brief87 described the local repair and manufacturing
nature of the work. The employees' brief88 showed the interdependence
in pay scales, seniority lists, apprentices and transfers between road and
shop service; and the government brief89 added the fact that the repairmen on the roads and in the shops were united in one organization and
would act as a unit in all disputes, The paralysis of interstate commerce
in shopmen's strikes was portrayed from past experience. Although the
interstate commerce issue was decided on these facts, other more controversial, perhaps more significant, issues were decided without such
data. The court held that the employer was required to co-operate with
the majority union in a reasonable effort to compose their differences,
that the employer was prohibited from bargaining with a minority union
and that a majority vote of all workers voting, even though less than a
majority of those eligible to vote, was sufficient to designate the representatives of the majority of the workers-all this without the benefit of
economic data.
4. USE OF ECONOMIC DATA IN THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD CASES

The use of economic data in the first five cases arising under the National Labor Relations Act was consciously planned. The National Labor
Relations Board established a Division of Economic Research for the
express purpose of preparing such material. This Division made elaborate
industrial studies and assisted the attorneys for the Board in the selection and presentation of labor economists as expert witnesses. The interpretative data obtained by this Division came to the United States Supreme Court in both the transcripts of the Board's hearings and in the
briefs of the Board's attorneys. The testimony of expert labor economists
offered to the Board in the Jones and Laughlin case was reprinted as an
official bulletin of the Board, 90 presented to the members of the Supreme
Court during an oral argument and referred to in the briefs of the Board
and occasionally in the briefs of counsel for employers.
An outstanding use of the industrial research of the Board's economists
S See Briefs for Petitioner in Case No. 324, Oct. Term x936 at 38-62.
88See Brief for Respondent in Case No. 324, Oct. Term 1936, at 77-84.
89See Brief for the United States, as amicus curiae in Case No. 324, Oct. Term i936.

9oNational Labor Relations Board, Bull, No. i, Governiental Protection of Labor's
Right to Organize.
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was made in demonstrating all the ramifications of the employers' operations in interstate commerce. Such evidence was largely incontrovertible,
and the Board's findings incorporating the evidence, made their way into
the decisions of the Supreme Court without dispute. Economy of space
limits us to a statement of the facts in the Jones and Laughlin case.
a) The Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation was a mammoth producer of pig
iron and steel with properties and transportation facilities in many parts of the country. It was engaged in the manufacture of pig iron and steel in Pittsburgh and Aliquippa, Pennsylvania; it fabricated structural steel in Long Island City, New York
and New Orleans, Louisiana; it exploited iron mines in Michigan and Minnesota and
carried the ore across the Great Lakes in its four steamships; it quarried limestone in
Pennsylvania and West Virginia; it operated coal mines in Pennsylvania and hauled
the coal on its own barges and towboats down the Mississippi or on its two railroads
which were connected with three large Eastern common carriers; it stored its products
in warehouses in Chicago, Detroit, Cincinnati and Memphis; it owned a distributing
agency for supplies and equipment for oil wells, pipelines and oil refineries; it had
sales offices in twenty American cities from coast to coast and a subsidiary for sales
in Canada. All of this was introduced in evidence before the Board and presented
pictorially in an illustrated map in the Board's brief before the Supreme Court. The
Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation employed 33,000 men in mining ore, 44,000
in mining coal, 4,000 in quarrying limestone, x6,ooo in manufacturing coke, 343,000
in manufacturing steel, and 83,ooo in transporting its products. Approximately seventy-five per cent of its products were shipped out of the state of Pennsylvania.
The Board contended 9z that the activities of the Jones and Laughlin
Corporation constituted a stream or flow of commerce, in which the Aliquippa plant was merely a focal point. The corporation, on the other
hand, insisted92 that its production at Aliquippa was an intrastate manufacturing activity, that the ore and coal brought in from other states
was stored in Aliquippa months in advance of their use, and that since
the raw materials were converted into pig iron and the pig iron into steel
products, separate and distinguishable items came into and went out of
the state. The majority court declined to subscribe to either view of the
situation, but held that even intrastate activities may fall within federal
control when closely and intimately related to interstate commerce, and
that the effect of a stoppage of the corporation's manufacturing operations
by industrial strife would have a direct and immediate effect upon such
commerce.
b) In the Fruehauf Trailer decision, the Court recited the findings of
the Board and without further comment upon the matter of interstate
commerce held that they were supported by the evidence.
91See Brief for Pl. in Error in Case No. 4r9, Oct. Term 1936.
9 See Brief for Def. in Error in Case No. 419, Oct. Term 1936.
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c) In the Friedman-HarryMarks case, the Board's counsel undertook93
to prove not only the infiltration of the employer's business in interstate
commerce but also the general interstate character of the men's clothing
industry of which it was an integral part. The company 94 stressed the
locality of its manufacturing operations, but the Court deemed its discussion in the Jones and Laughlin case sufficiently pertinent to this case
so as not to call for repetition. Although the minority court 9 declared
that all three manufacturing cases involved the same form of intrastate
commerce, it used this case to stress its point. As urged by the company's
briefs, it distinguished three separate stages in industry-the purchase of
the raw materials, the manufacture of steel, trailers or clothing, and the
distribution of the finished product. The effect of the intrastate production in the second stage upon the interstate commerce in the first and
third stages was said to be far too remote and indirect to come within the
control of Congress. The differences of opinion among the members of
the court rested clearly upon different interpretations of economic interrelationships, and the accumulation of economic data in the briefs of
counsel was obviously influential, if not conclusive.
d) In the Associated Press case, the Associated Press argued 96 that its
operations were not for profit, that it retained title to the news during
interstate transmission, and that therefore it was not engaged in interstate commerce. The court held, however, that "Interstate communication of a business nature, whatever the means of such communication, is
97
interstate commerce regulable by Congress under the Constitution."
e) In the Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. case, the argument 98 that the regulation of the intrastate activities of the employer
could not be separated from the regulation of its interstate activities
was rendered immaterial by the findings of the Court with respect to the
intrastate activities of the other employers. The Court gave its assurance
that if a company engaged solely in intrastate commerce not affecting
interstate commerce should be brought before the Court, it would not be
held subject to the act.
The collective bargaining provisions of the National Labor Relations
Act were brought within the Congressional commerce power by proof
93See Brief for Petitioner in Cases No. 422 and 423, Oct. Term 1936.
94 See Brief for Respondent in Cases No. 422 and 423, Oct. Term 1936.
9s See dissenting opinion in Labor Board Cases, 3oi U.S. i, 76 (1937).
9 See Brief for Petitioner in Case No. 365, Oct. Term 1936.

Press v. N.L.R.B., 3o1 U.S. io3, 128 (1937).
98See Briefs in Case No. 469, Oct. Term 1936.
97Associated
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that industrial strife and strikes in the activities mentioned above result
from an absence of collective bargaining, and cause a direct and proximate obstruction to the flow of interstate commerce. To establish this
conclusion, the Board's Division of Economic Research prepared a section of the Jones and Laughlin case brief entitled, "The Burden and Injury to Interstate Commerce Resulting from Industrial Strife." 99 This
commenced with a general statement on the paralyzing effect of strikes
citing illustrations from expert testimony in the record and other nonlegal sources concerning the Steel Strike of i919, the Pacific Coast lumber
strike of 1934 and the Chevrolet Motor Co. strike of 1935. It referred also

to a table of strikes which listed the number of strikes, employees involved
and man-days of work lost in each year from 1916 to 1936. The statement
continued with a discussion of the periods during which industrial strikes
were particularly acute, of the industries seriously burdened by strikes,
of certain notorious strikes, of the courts' recognition of an intention to
burden interstate commerce by strikes, of the intervention of federal
troops in railroad and steel strikes, of the federal commissions of inquiry
in railroad, coal and textile strikes, of the federal conciliation service in
15,900 strikes involving sixteen million employees, of the federal regulation of labor relations in war industries, of the federal legislation on collective bargaining in the railroad industry, and of the rising tide of labor
disputes for two years prior to the establishment of the first National
Labor Board. These facts were interpreted to prove that strikes were increasing, that they obstructed the flow of interstate commerce, that
many strikes were due to a refusal to bargain collectively, and that collective bargaining and government intervention to that end promoted industrial harmony and the continuity of interstate commerce.
This argument was heavily studded with references to the expert testimony of labor economists in the hearings before the Board, to additional
reports of government agencies, and to writings of authorities on labor
problems. The similar evidence presented by the labor economists in the
early hearings and reprinted in the Bulletin No. i of the Board was cited
for corroboration.z °°
The briefs for the employers discussed this economic material in three
of the cases. In the Jones and Laughlin case, counsel for the corporation
99See Briefs for P. in Error in Case No. 419, Oct. Term 1936.
XooIn N.L.R.B. v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 3o U.S. 4 9 (1937); N.L.R.B. v. Friedman-Harry
Marks Clothing Co., 3oi U.S. 58 (1937); and Washington, V. & M. Coach Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
301 U.S. 142 (i937), the Board merely referred to the Jones & Laughlin and to the Associated
Press briefs for its argument that.the act was a valid exercise of the federal power to protect

interstate commerce from the burdens and injuries of industrial strife.
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devoted a section of their brief to the "Hypothetical Evidence" of the
government, "none of which seemed to have any relevancy to the issues
of the case."' °
It is a defiance of reason and good judgment to argue that guesswork evidence of
this character can bridge the distance between the discharge of 13 employees and
the movement of interstate commerce.',°

The brief filed for the Associated Press criticized the Board's Bulletin
No. i in that the Bulletin merely demonstrated that strikes interrupt the
continuity of production, not the continuity of commerce, and in that it
failed to compare the size, permanency, or causation of obstructions resulting from non-collective action with all other possible obstructions to
interstate commerce. 0 3 The employer's brief did not attempt to supply
such comparative data, except to state:
.... The evidence is not only ex parle, prepared by the proponents of the Act
with a view to proving a doubtful point, but it is also inadequate .... it fails utterly
to distinguish between different industries, between unorganized and organized workers, or between overreaching employers and those who are more public spirited.
Finally, this evidence completely ignores the fact, as the daily newspapers show, that
strikes are quite as frequent in organized as in unorganized trades."4
The brief for the Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co. characterized the
economic data of the Board as "rank hearsay, rumor, unqualified opinion
and totally irrelevant, immaterial and unrelated matters of no probative
force."" 5
The majority court, however, acknowledged the relevancy and probative value of the Board's economic data. Although the Chief Justice in
the Jones and Laughlin decision, stated that the causation of strife by
refusal to confer and negotiate was "such an outstanding fact in the
history of labor disturbances that it is a proper subject of judicial notice
and requires no citation of instances, ' " °6 he went on to mention some of
the instances cited in the government's briefs, and he listed in a footnote
several of the non-legal documents referred to by the government as
well as the Board's Bulletin No. 1." ° 7 The Court found that "experience
has abundantly demonstrated" that the provisions for collective bargaining were often an essential condition of industrial peace; but the briefs
"0,
202

See Brief for Def. in Error in Case No. 419, Oct. Term 1936, at i 9 .
Id. at 21.

"03See

Brief for Petitioner in Case No. 365, Oct. Term 1936 at

24.

04Id. at 6r.

10"See Brief for Respondent in Cases No.

422

and 423, Oct. Term z936, at 26.

106N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. i, 42 (1937).

107Id. at 43 n. 8.
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of the government made that experience seem abundant. The minority
court found the "mass of testimony-largely irrelevant." The use of interpretative data was acknowledged even when not accredited.
In the determination of the other issues by the Court, such as the effect
of compulsory collective bargaining in a newspaper establishment upon
the freedom of the press, the existence of specific unfair labor practices,
the adequacy of the Board's notices and hearings and the sufficiency of
the evidence of a violation of the act, no economic material or expert
opinions were discussed.
After these benedictory decisions, the Board's use of economic data
varied considerably.
a) In the Pennsylvaniaand Pacific Greyhound cases, the primary issue
was the power of the Board to order the disestablishment of a company
union, and except for a footnote reference to economic documents on the
advantage of employer's recognition over rival unions, the power was
debated' 8 and affirmed as a matter of the reasonable construction of the
language of the act.
b) In the Santa Cruz and Consolidated Edison cases, the great issue
was whether collective bargaining in a fruit packing company and a public
utility affected interstate commerce. Considerable interpretative material
was employed. There was introduced at the hearing before the Board
evidence on the one hand that thirty-seven per cent of the total output of
the Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. went into interstate commerce, that
daily 3000 to 4oo0 cases were loaded onto various vehicles in a constant
stream of loading and shipping, and that when the warehousemen struck,
members of other locals of their union refused to haul the "hot" cargo and
all shipments of the company's goods in interstate commerce stopped;"09
and on the other hand it was shown that practically all of the fruits and
vegetables were grown within the state and that the interstate shipments
of the company were only a small part of its business." 0 In the Consolidated Edison case, there was evidence that the utility company supplied
electric energy to interstate railroads, an interstate tunnel, trans-Atlantic
piers and steamers, interstate telegraph and telephone systems, a transAtlantic radio service, an airport, lighthouses, post offices and various
other federal buildings as well as that the company purchased large quantities of oil, coal and other supplies from other states. With such evidence,
the court had little difficulty in indicating the effect of a strike in either
los
See Brief for Petitioner in Case No. 413, Oct. Term 1937 at 25.
See Brief for Respondent in Case No. $36, Oct. Term i937.
1"0 See Brief for Petitioner in Case No. 536, Oct. Term 1937.
l09
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business upon interstate commerce. The Consolidated Edison case"x also
involved the power of the Board to disestablish a collective bargaining
agreement with an independent, A.F. of L. union. The briefs of the rival
unionsI2 contained many accusations and few facts; yet they conveyed

the spirit of the A.F. of L.-C.I.O. conflict, and the court chose not to
penalize the employer or the A.F. of L. union for the apparent preferences
of the employer.
c) The Myers,"' 3 Newport News"l4 and Ford"s cases raised purely procedura questions and no economic data were used in them.
d) The Mackay Radio case affirmed the power of the Board to reinstate workers who, in the rehiring after an unsuccessful strike, were discriminated against for their union activities. The opposite conclusion was
reached in the Fansteel case with respect to sit-down strikers who were
guilty of violence and the destruction of property. In the former case
no interpretative facts were introduced,x' whereas in the latter both the
employer's" ' 7 and the government's" 8 briefs referred to the statistics and
the economic discussions of sit-down strikes. The court treated both
cases, however, as abstract matters of statutory construction.
e) In the Sands" 9 and Columbian Enameling1 0 cases, the Board's counsel offered no economic data, and the court differed with the Board's
interpretation of the narrative facts. The cancellation of a conference
with United States Department of Labor conciliators was held not a refusal to bargain with employees; the dosing of a plant upon the union's
breach of a seniority agreement and the reopening with members of a
rival union were held not a denial of collective bargaining; but the economic implications of the immediate situations were not presented. It
may be that confidence in the Supreme Court's sympathetic understanding of labor relations, as illustrated in the Board's early cases, led to a
neglect of economic data in the later ones, but the recent reverses indicate the continued need for such interpretative material.
i See Brief for Respondent in Case No. ig, Oct. Term 1938.
112 See Brief for Intervenor-Respondent and Brief for amicus curiae in Case No. 19, Oct.
Term 1938.
X3 Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
"14Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Schauffier, 303 U.S. 54 (1938).
"s Ford Motor Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 364 (1939).
"6 See Briefs in Case No. 7o6, Oct. Term 1938.
117 See Brief for Respondent in Case No. 436, Oct. Term 1938.

1x8See Brief for Petitioner in Case No. 436, Oct. Term 1938.
219See

Brief for Petitioner in Case No. 274, Oct. Term 1938.

120See Briefs for Petitioner in Case No.

229,

Oct. Term 1938.
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The use of economic data in these cases attests to its service in developing the law of collective bargaining-a service that is still unfinished.
The Division of Economic Research of the National Labor Relations
Board has already found occasion to prepare material showing the history
of collective bargaining in many industries in order to cast light upon
factors of company interference and domination. It has made specific
studies of the profit and loss of businesses to determine the good or bad
faith of an employer refusing to entertain the wage demands of his employees. It has also investigated such isolated problems as the effect of the
presence of public citizens in the collective bargaining conference room.
The numerous problems confronting employers and employees in their
bargaining relationship are seldom subject to positive analysis or absolute
determination; but the Board is required to make reasonable interpretations of all the obscure or conflicting circumstances, and the results of
economic research are a guide worthy of its attention and recognition by
the courts.
II.

LABOR LEGISLATION
I. HOURS

The decisions of the United States Supreme Court on state legislation
limiting the hours of work in private employment have reflected the battle
between the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution and the
police power of the states.1 2 ' In the Holden"' case, the Court undertook

a detailed examination of the doctrines of due process of law and the
police power in various fields of law. Upon the basis of the historical
trends and precedents, it upheld the Utah eight hour law 2 3 for men in

mines, smelters and refineries as a police measure bearing a reasonable
relation to the protection of health in a hazardous and unwholesome occupation. This doctrine was set back by the decision in the Lochner24
case invalidating a ten hour law12 5 for men in bakeries. In this uncertain
situation-the regulation of hours for men-the Supreme Court considered a succession of statutes governing the hours of employment of
women. The Oregon- 6 and Ohio- 7 ten hour laws and the California eight
121State legislation limiting hours of work in public employment was upheld by the Supreme Court as within the absolute power of the state legislature because no one has a right
to public work without the consent of the state. Atkin v. Kansas, ii U.S. 207 (1903).
-22Holden v. Hardy, T69 U.S. 366 (z898).
123 Utah L. I896, C. 72, p. 219.
124 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

12SN.Y. L. 1897, C.415, § io.
"2 Ore. L.

1907, C. 200 § I.

127

Ohio L. 1911, p. 488.
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hour law for women12S in a large and inclusive list of employments were
upheld for the reason that women's physical structure and maternal functions made reasonable the special protection afforded her. In these decisions'129 the court devoted much attention to the effect of excluding many
occupations and exempting certain workers upon the constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the laws. In each case it concluded that the
law properly attacked the evil where it was most felt and proceeded
cautiously to eliminate it step by step. After upholding both ten and
eight hour laws for women, the Supreme Court again considered a ten
hour law for men and in the Bunting30 case declared it a reasonable police
regulation3' for the preservation of health. Related to these cases on
hours of work were the decisions of the Supreme Court upholding statutes
prohibiting Sunday32 and night work 3 3 and requiring the posting of working schedules. 34 All of these statutes were subjected to the tests of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and they were sustained as valid expressions of
the police power of the states only when the Court deemed them reasonably designed to promote safety and health.
Holden v. Hardy; Lochner v. New York.-The use of economic data in
these cases bore a direct relation to the opposite conclusions reached. In
the former case, the dangers to health in mining were deemed so well
known that the government referred to them without citing any specific
studies,'35 and the court found that they had been recognized so long
that they could not then be questioned. In the latter case, on the contrary, the conditions of the bakery industry had not been so well publicized, and the state's brief 36 failed to present interpretative data whereas
the employer's brief 37 asserted that modem bakeries were machine-operated, well lighted, clean and free from dust. In an appendix, it recorded
tables of trades showing their mortality rates, their susceptibility to the
introduction of deleterious matters into the body, their exposure to conditions that interfere with nutrition and quotations from medical writers128 Cal.

L. 19i1, C. 258, amended Cal. L. 19r3, c. 352.
Hawley v. Walker, 232 U.s. 718 (i914); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915); Bosley
v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (i915).
13o Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (x917).
X31Ore. L. 1913, C. 102, § 2.
132Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299 (i896).
129

Radice v. New York, 264 U.S.

x36

292 (1924).
Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (,914).
See Brief for P1. in Error in Cases Nos. 26x and 264, Oct. Term z898, at 6, 8-12, 32.
See Brief for Def. in Error in Case No. 292, Oct. Term I904, at 3, 6.
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See Brief for P1. in Error in Case No.

13
134

13s

292,

Oct. Term

19o4,

at x8-45 and appendix.
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all to the effect that the baking industry was at least average in the wholesomeness of its working conditions.
The majority opinion referred expressly to the statistics regarding the
relative wholesomeness of various occupations and adopted the argument
that the law was designed to regulate conditions of employment among
suijuris men in a private business, not dangerous in any real or substantial degree to the health of employees. 38 A minority opinion 39quoted from
a book on diseases of workers and from an official report of the New York
Bureau of Statistics of Labor to indicate the reasonable relationship between a limitation of hours and the health of bakers, but none of these
authorities was supplied by the state's brief. Justice Holmes, in his separate dissent, openly declared that, "This case is decided upon an economic
theory which a large part of the country does not entertain.' ' x4 He expressed his conviction that the constitution should not be interpreted to
bar progressive legislation in his famous phrase: "The Fourteenth amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."'' 4' In his
opinion the court did "not need research to show ''I 42 that a reasonable
man might think the eight hour law a proper measure on the score of
health, but the research to the contrary, presented in the brief of the
employer, apparently influenced a majority of the court to disagree with
him.

Muller v. Oregon.-This case struck a high note in the use of interpretative data. Although the employer included no economic data in his brief,
Mr. Louis D. Brandeis, appearing specially on behalf of the state, filed
a monumental factual brief.143 With little discussion and a few legal citations he presented the legal principles concerning the liberty to purchase
or sell labor, the reasonable restraint permitted under the police power,
the necessity in legislation for a real or substantial relation to health and
safety and the presumption of constitutionality rebuttable only on proof
that the act is unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary; but he added a
factual brief to demonstrate by facts of common knowledge, of which the
court might take judicial notice, that there was reasonable ground for
believing that a ten hour law for women promoted health, safety and the
general welfare. The factual brief, compiled by a social worker, Josephine
Goldmark, consisted of two parts. The first listed foreign and American
legislation restricting the hours of labor of women. The second presented
"The world's experience upon which the hours legislation was based."
138

Lochner v. New York, i98 U.S. 45, 59 (i9o5).

"39
Id. at 70.
'4oId. at 75.
'4' Ibid.
-,Id. at 76.
4'See Brief for Def. in Error in Case No. xo7, Oct. Term 1907.
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It was composed of a brief statement of argumentative points, each followed by supporting quotations from official reports, the testimony of experts before official commissions and books on economics, medicine and
factory legislation. The main argumentative points were labelled (i) Dangers of long hours; (2) Shorter hours the only possible protection; (3)
General benefits of short hours; (4) Economic aspects of short hourseffect on output, effect on regularity of employment, adaptation of customers to shorter hours, incentive to improvements in manufacture, effect
on scope of women's employment; (5) Uniformity of restriction; (6) Reasonableness of the ten hour day; and (7) Laundries-present character,
bad effect upon health, safety and morals, irregularity of work. The theme
of it all was that long hours of work were detrimental to the health of
women primarily because of woman's peculiar physical characteristics,
and that shorter hours of work produced general economic benefits.
The Court mentioned the brief in its opinion and inserted an epitome
of it in the margin. Then it paid the following restrained tribute to such
probative material:
The legislation and opinions referred to in the margin may not be, technically
speaking, authorities, and in them is little or no discussion of the constitutional question presented to us for determination, yet they are significant of a widespread belief
that woman's physical structure, and the functions she performs in consequence
thereof, justify special legislation restricting or qualifying the conditions under which
she should be permitted to toil. Constitutional questions, it is true, are not settled by
even a consensus of present public opinion, for it is the peculiar value of a written constitution that it places in unchanging form limitations upon legislative action, and
thus gives a permanence and stability to popular government which otherwise would
be lacking. At the same time, when a question of fact is debated and debatable, and
the extent to which a special constitutional limitation goes is affected by the truth
in respect to that fact, a widespread and long continued belief concerning it is worthy
of consideration. We take judicial cognizance of all matters of general knowledge.44
The interpretative data in the Brandeis-Goldmark brief was "worthy
of consideration," in that it helped settle effectively the reasonableness of
general hours legislation for women.
Hawley v. Walker; Miller v. Wilson; Bosley v. McLaughlin.-All of
these cases repeated the use of the Brandeis-Goldmark brief on hour laws
for women. The specific industry section was altered to cover millineries,
dressmaking shops, telephone and telegraph systems, restaurants, hotels
and hospitals as included in the new statutes. In the BosleyT45 case, there
was appended, in its entirety, a publication of the United States Bureau
'44 208
14S See

U.S. 412, 420 (i908).
Brief for Def. in Error in Cases No. 362 and 363, Oct. Term 1914.
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of Education on the educational status of nursing, and the Court quoted
from it at great length to justify the hours regulation of student nurses
and the exclusion of graduate nurses.'16 The briefs for the employers47
sought to upset the laws on the ground that they were discriminatory,
but the Court found legal precedents in support of the step by step attack
upon social evils.
Bunting v. Oregon.-In this case, Mr. Brandeis filed another of his
historic hour-law briefs, X 8 this time revised to apply to the regulation of
the hours of men. In outline and method it was the same as his other
briefs. After the filing of this brief, Mr. Brandeis was elevated to the
United States Supreme Court bench; Mr. Felix Frankfurter was substituted as counsel, and he filed a supplemental brief bringing the information in the original brief up to date. The extent to which this brief
relied upon non-legal authorities and their nature are indicated by the
thirty-five page list of sources under the headings: (i) Public documents;
(2) Medical and laboratory; (3) Economic and social; and (4) Business
experiments.49 The employer's counsel filed a reply brief complaining
that the data in the Frankfurter brief did not pertain to the flour milling
industry but related to other industries and other conditions such as
5 0 Counsel cited,
overcrowded housing and improper living.Y
on his own
part, two economic references to show that recent developments in the
milling industry had made it compare favorably with other industries
with respect to hazards to health.
The Court decided there were no facts proving the act unreasonable
or arbitrary. This placed the burden of proof where it was always supposed to be-upon the party challenging the constitutionality of the statute. The Brandeis-Goldmark-Frankfurter brief had served its purpose
well, and the Court required or at least suggested the adoption of its
technique by the opposing side.
That does not mean that the progress of hours regulation by the states
has been assured. The question of how short a work day will be regarded
as reasonable is still unanswered. The question of whether the limitation
of hours may be based on economic grounds independent of its bearing
upon the protection of health is becoming increasingly important. In a
recent case before the state Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, a factual
11'236 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1915).
X47See Brief for P1. in Error in Cases No. 362 and 363, Oct. Term 19]4.
X48See

Brief for Def. in Error in Case No. 38, Oct. Term 1916.

See Supplemental Brief for Def. in Error in Case No. 38, Oct. Term x916.
ISO
See Reply Brief for Pl. in Error in Case No. 38, Oct. Term 1916.
'49
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brief in support of a law, limiting the work week for all employees (with
certain exceptions) to forty-four hours, stressed efficiency of production
and distribution of purchasing power as well as health.'51 That case unfortunately was decided on the technical ground of an improper delegation of legislative authority. s' New advances in hours legislation will
continue to require new economic briefs.
The immediate scene for such action has probably been shifted to the
field of federal regulation. The federal statutes on hours of work have
been few and there has been little litigation over them, 5s but the recent
'5'

Holgate Bros Co. v. Bashore, 331 Pa.

255,

2oo Atl. 672 (1938). The state's brief made

the following contentions, "I. The adjustment of working hours has been progressive with the
development of the industrial revolution and has three major interests for society: (1)conservation of health; (2) greater efficiency of production; (3) better distribution of purchasing
power. 11. Hours of work are intimately associated with the susceptibility of workers to illness
and accidents. IT.A ceiling of hours must be proposed in order to prevent degradation of
labor standards and purchasing power in the present era of depressed employment. IV. A reduction in hours to the 44-hour level does not necessarily involve greater production costs,
because the shorter work-week is offset by increased hourly output. V. Pennsylvania industry is not exceptional but bears a direct relationship to industry elsewhere and will show similar trends. VI. The 44-hour week is not unreasonable. In fact, it sets a maximum higher than
that of many states of the United States, and than that of many of the most progressive
foreign countries." This 348 page brief contained 23 tables and charts in the text, 26 tables
in the appendices, and 153 non-legal citations.
'S2Ibid.
1S3 It was declared in i5Stat. 77 (x868), that eight hours shall constitute a day's work for
all laborers, workmen and mechanics employed by or on behalf of the government of the
United States. The Supreme Court construed that to be merely a direction from Congress to
the officers of the government (from principal to agent) that eight hours is deemed to be a
proper length of time for a day's labor and not a prohibition against an agreement for a longer
or shorter day. United States v. Martin, 94 U.S. 400 (1876). When the law was amended to
prescribe a definite, binding work day, no one doubted its constitutionality and the Court
has had no occasion to rule on it. The same has been our experience with statutes limiting the
hours of service on public works or on public purchase contracts. The right of the government
to spend its money or to contract on any terms it pleases has been undenied. The federal laws
regulating hours in private employment in which the government has no interest of its own
have been based on different principles. The act prohibiting work on railroads in excess of
sixteen hours a day and for certain workers in excess of nine hours, was entitled "An act to
promote the safety of employees and travelers." 34 Stat. 1415 (1907), 4S U.S.C.A. §§ 61-4
(1928). This has been upheld as a valid exercise of the interstate commerce power with the
acknowledgment that the length of hours of service has a direct relation to efficiency and the
protection of life and property. B. & 0. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 221 U.S.
612 (igxx); United States v. A.T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 220 U.S. 37 (igr). The more general efforts
to limit the hours of work on private employment by federal law have met a worse fate. The
restriction of hours for the work of children, embodied in the federal child labor laws (discussed below), has been held unconstitutional as an incident to the general child labor regulation. Similarly, the limitations upon hours under the National Industrial Recovery Act and
the National Bituminous Coal Comm'n Act have been held unconstitutional along with the
regulation of wages and unfair trade practices (discussed below).
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enactment of the Fair Labor Standards ActV5 4 presents once more the

question of the validity of federal regulation of hours of work in private
employment. In its blanket provision of a forty-four hour week (to be
reduced to forty-two and then forty) for all employees, male and female, in
practically all occupations engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for interstate commerce, it raises issues broader than
those ever before the Court. The need for economic data and the potentialities of its use in defending the hours provisions of this measure should
be apparent from the account of its use in the hours cases discussed above.
2.

CHILD LABOR

The United States Supreme Court has ruled that both the interstate
commerce and the taxing powers of Congress do not embrace the regulation of child labor. In the Hammer case, 5 5 it held unconstitutional a
statute' s6 prohibiting the transportation in interstate commerce of commodities manufactured in mines or factories, in which within thirty days
prior to the shipment, there were employed children under specified ages
In the Bailey case, 5 7 it held unconstitutional a statute5 8 imposing a tax
of ten per cent upon the net income of persons knowingly employing certain child labor.
Hammer v. Dagenhar.-Inthis case, the immorality and injuriousness
of child labor were presented by the government with elaborate citations
from reports of legislative committees and economic studies. s9 The opposing briefl6o countered with some evidence on the illness of non-workers
as well as workers but its main argument was that such evils as existed in
child labor did not remain in the product which alone was the subject of
interstate commerce. The majority court held that the commerce power
did not extend to the prohibition of the transportation of ordinary commodities, not obnoxious in and of themselves. In commenting on prior
decisions prohibiting the transportation of lottery tickets, liquor, and
prostitutes, the Court held that the element of transportation was indispensable to the evil in those cases but not so in this. The minority opinion 6' found the statute within the commerce power of Congress because
"X452

Stat. io6o (z938), 29 U.S.C.A. 203 (Supp. 1938).

Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (i918).
"s6 39 Stat. 675 (i9i6).
's5 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
'S8 4o Stat. 1138 (ig9g).
'55

-s See Brief for Pl. in Error in Case No. 704, Oct. Term 1917.
z6o See Brief for Def. in Error in Case No. 704, Oct. Term 1917.
16 ' 2 4 7 U.S. 251, 277-8I (i918).
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it prohibited the carriage of goods in interstate commerce. Since Congress
prohibited merely the act of shipment across state lines, it did not meddle
with the internal affairs of the states. The commerce power had been
used as a foothold to break up monopolies, to drive out state bank notes,
and to prohibit the transportation of innocent articles sold thiough fraud;
it might also be used to eliminate child labor. Both the majority and
minority opinions were based more on theory and law than on economic
data.
The government also sought to uphold the federal law because of the
economic discrimination caused by variations in the state child labor
laws. It illustrated the discrimination with economic data showing particularly a migration of cotton manufacturing plants from New England
to the South. The opposing brief attempted to justify the variations in
the state laws on the basis of variations in climate, age of child maturity,
distribution of wealth and density of population; and at the same time
it attempted to minimize the disparities on the ground that the states had
independently regulated child labor pari passu with the extent to which
they had become industrialized. The Court held, however, that the commerce power did not extend to the prevention of unfair competition.
The power of' Congress to regulate child labor through its control over
interstate commerce will again be presented to the Supreme Court under
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The possibility of utilizing economic data to obtain a reversal of the Hammerdecision may be found in the
discussion of the National Labor Relations Act cases and in the comment
on the wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act herein.
Bailey v. Drexel FurnitureCo.-The government's brief'6 2 argued that
the Court had no power to question the motives of Congress in the exercise of its taxing power. This power had been employed before, notably
in the tariffs upon certain imports and in the tax on oleomargarine, primarily to accomplish a social purpose rather than to raise revenue. The
employer's briefr 63 relied upon the record of Congressional debates to
show that the tax bill was enacted in order to circumvent the decision of
Hammer v. Dagenhart. In order to demonstrate that the tax had no reasonable relation to the raising of revenue and was not adapted to that end,
it showed that the salaries of the persons employed in the child labor tax
division of the Bureau of nternal Revenue for the years i919, 192o and
1921 amounted to approximately $3oo,ooo while the receipts from the
tax totalled approximately $27,ooo. The Court found that the law reguz62See Brief for P1. in Error in Case No.
x63 See Brief

6

57, Oct. Term 1921.
for Def. in Error in Case No. 657, Oct. Term 1921.
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lated child labor by the use of a so-called tax as a penalty. Although
there is no present disposition to reexamine the taxing power with respect
to child labor, the intervening cases on social security taxes indicate
what effective use might now be made of economic data in such a child
labor case.
3.

WAGES

The power of legislatures to regulate wages in private employment
has long been argued before the Supreme Court. 6 4 That body early upheld statutes governing the manner and time of wage payment;16s but
in the hours law cases the Court took occasion to observe that the wages
of the workers were not involved, implying that minimum wage laws
might not be constitutional. 6 6 In the Wilson case, a law reducing hours
of work on railroads and prohibiting a reduction in wages was upheld
as a temporary and emergency wage regulation in an industry affected
67
with a public interest.1
The District of Columbia statute was the first regular minimum wage
law to be discussed by the Supreme Court. 68 It provided for the fixing
of wages of women and minors on the basis of a cost of living adequate to
maintain good health and morality. The majority court in the Adkins
x64The right of a sovereign to stipulate the terms of its contracts or the contracts of its
agents having been well established, the United States Supreme Court has never been called
upon to approve the power of a legislature to set wages for public employment or for employment on public contracts. At the moment, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
is considering Lukens Steel Co. v. Perkins, No. 1368, which is a challenge of a minimum wage
determination under the Public Contracts Act, 49 Stat. 2o36 (r936), 4' U.S.C.A. 35 (Supp.
1938).

z6SThe United States Supreme Court approved a statute requiring redemption in cash of
store orders or other evidence of indebtedness issued in payment for services rendered, Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13 (igo); Keokee Consolidated Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234
U.S. 224 (1914); a statute forbidding the payment of seamen's wages in advance, Patterson v.
Bark Endora, 19o U.S. x69 (i9o3); a statute prohibiting contracts to pay miners employed at
quantity rates upon the basis of screened coal instead of the weight of coal within the mine,
McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539 (i909); Rail and River Coal Co. v. Yaple, 236 U.S. 338
(I915); and a statute regulating the assignment of wages, Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222
U.S. 225 (I9II).

26 In Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917), a provision for the payment of time and
a half for overtime was carefully interpreted as a penalty against overtime work and not a
minimum wage requirement.
167Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917).

169Justice Brandeis, having prepared the brief in defense of the Oregon minimum wage law
shortly before he was appointed to the Supreme Court bench, did not participate in the hearing
of that case and the Justices of the Court divided equally on the question of its constitutionality. Stettler v. O'Hara, 243 U.S. 629 (1917). Since the State Supreme Court had upheld that
act, it remained in full force and effect, but the definitive opinion of the United States Supreme
Court on minimum wage laws was not announced until the Adkins case was decided.
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case16 9 found this an arbitrary infringement of liberty of contract because
it was too vague, because it was unrelated to the nature or value of the
work done, and because it discriminated against women workers. On the
basis of this decision, the similar minimum wage laws of Arizona and
7
Arkansas were held unconstitutional.1 0
There intervened at this point two wage regulation cases growing out
of comprehensive schemes to control fair trade as well as labor practices.
The National Industrial Recovery Act 7 1 provided for industrial codes
establishing, among other things, maximum hours and minimum wages.
The Supreme Court in the Sckechter decision invalidated the act as an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority because it empowered
unofficial agencies to make law and because it failed to specify adequate
standards for executive action.' 2 It expressly declared the wage and hour
regulations too remotely connected with interstate commerce to fall within the power of Congress. Undaunted by this decision, Congress enacted
the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of I93517 which provided for a
bituminous coal code and incorporated, among various trade and labor
regulations, the minimum wages to be set by a collective bargaining contract. Coal operators were induced to accept the code by an exemption
of ninety per cent of an excise tax placed upon all coal mined. In the
Carter case, 7 4 the Supreme Court declared the wage and hour provisions
of this act an unconstitutional effort to regulate local matters as well as
an improper delegation of legislative authority to private individuals. In
both general plans to regulate trade and labor practices, the labor provisions were singled out for special treatment and declared to be beyond
the power of Congress.
When in the depression year 1933 the State of New York desired a
minimum wage law, it sought to take advantage of certain implications
in the majority opinion in the Adkins case; its statute therefore provided
that wages both less than the fair and reasonable value of services rendered and a sum sufficient to meet the minimum cost of living for health
were oppressive and unreasonable and should be replaced by a minimum
"fair wage," to be set on a basis fairly and reasonably commensurate with
x69Adkins

v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
v. Sardell, 269 U.S. 530 (1925); Donham v. West Nelson Co., 273 U.S. 657

X70Murphy
(1927)17z 48

Stat. 195 (I933), z5 U.S.C.A. § 703 (Supp. 1938).
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 49S (i93).

X72Schechter
7349
"4

Stat. 991 (1935).

Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,

298

U.S. 238 (1935)-
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the value of the services rendered

-75

In the Morehead case,'7' however,

the Supreme Court found that this retained all of the vulnerability of
77
the District law. Within the next year, in the West Coast Hotel case,
the Supreme Court reversed itself. In passing upon the Washington minimum wage law,'17 which had the same standard (the necessary cost of
living to maintain health) as the District law adopted, the Court found
the law a reasonable exercise of the legislature's police power, and expressly overruled the Adkins decision. The use of economic data in the
minimum wage cases well illustrates the possibilities of that technique
in an atmosphere charged with strong convictions.
Adkins v. Children's Hospital.-In this case, the brief,X79 prepared by
Mr. Felix Frankfurter and Josephine Goldmark, followed the prototype
of the Brandeis-Goldmark brief; it attempted to demonstrate, by presenting numerous quotations from American and foreign non-legal authorities in support of the measure,'5 ° that the reasonableness of the legislation was a matter of common knowledge. It first sought to prove the
successful working of minimum wage legislation and emphasized that (i)
the unfair depression of the lowest wage level of women workers was
lessened or removed; (2) industrial efficiency of both employers and employees was stimulated; (3) competing employers were benefited; (4) an
influence toward industrial peace was created; (5) the legislation was
effective and fair, and that (6) prophecies of evil were disproved by actual
experience: (a) business was not hurt, but helped, (b) minimum wages did
not become maximum, and (c) displacement of workers was inconsiderable. Its second part listed the minimum wage laws of this and foreign
countries. The third section discussed the need for minimum wage legislation for women in the District of Columbia and the whole United
States and presented expert testimony on the wages of women, the minimum standard of living and the evils of inadequate wages.
Lest the Court heed the sentiment quoted in favor of the act, counsel
for the employer quoted eminent officials of the A.F. of L., the National
Women's Party, the National Women's Suffrage Association, the Equal
Rights Association and the Federation of Business and Professional
'7s N.Y.L. 1933, C. 584.

-,'Morehead
'77 West
178

v. People ex rd. Tipaldo,

298

U.S. 587 (1936).

Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (I937).

Wash. L. 1913, C. 174.

179 See

Brief for United States in Cases No. 795 and 796, Oct. Term

too See

Brief for Def. in Error in Case No. 107, Oct, Term 1907.

1922.
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Women's Clubs to show that there was no real desire for minimum wage
laws for women.,'
'The majority court acknowledged the "large number of printed opinions approving the policy of the minimum wage" but added "our own
'
reading had disclosed a large number to the contrary."IS2
It found the
"mass of reports and opinions of special observers and students on the
great benefits of minimum wage legislation ....

interesting but only

mildly persuasive."' 8 3 To the minority justices, however, the factual material in the government's brief was "very respectable authority."'8 4 and "a
very remarkable collection of documents"'158 amply proving the reasonableness of the legislation.
The brief for the employers also objected to the uncertainty of the
minimum wage standards in the act.

86

It presented the different minima

determined for mercantile, hotel and laundry workers and observed that
the same woman shifting from one employment to another could not
require such different wages on the basis of her health or morality. It
stressed the differences in economic circumstances among women and
noted that no minimum was needed by the woman of adequate means
who worked for the joy of working.
Moreover the standards referred to the needs of the employee and ignored the necessities of the employer in that they required no service of
equivalent value from the employee. The majority court accepted this
criticism despite, or perhaps because of, the lack of economic data to explain its full significance.
8 7
Morehead v. Tipaldo.-The factual brief of the State of New York'
presented statistical evidence and corroborative opinion from numerous
government publications and economic treatises to prove that since the
Adkins decision, there had appeared in industry an ever increasing number of female breadwinners, that the depression of 193o had brought a
dearer realization of their maladjustments and that remedial action which
formerly may have seemed oppressive now appeared necessary and wise.
A brief filed by the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York supplemented this with statistics from the records of local public agencies to
show that the municipality had been compelled to augment earnings with
1st See Brief for Def. in

Error in Cases No. 795 and 796, Oct. Term, 1922.

182Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
183rd. at 56o.
8
1 4 Id. at 564 (Chief Justice Taft).
its
Id. at 570 (Justice Holmes).
z86See Brief for Def. in Error in Cases No. 795 and 796, Oct. Term 1922.
187 See Brief for Pl. in Error in Case No. 838, Oct. Term i935, at i-4o and appendix.
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relief, thereby subsidizing low wage employers and that many of the
prostitutes of New York had had antecedent employment at very low
wages.'

88

The employer's briefr5 9 responded that these facts added nothing new
to the data presented in the ijo6 page factual briefs in the Adkins case.
The majority court observed that although the State of New York
referred to changes in conditions since the Adkins case, the factual background stated in the law was the same as recited in an emergency bill,
which had been vetoed and which attempted to establish a minimum
wage for men as well as women. The facts of need, it inferred, were the
same for men and women; hence the regulation of the latter and not the
former was discriminatory. The Court said nothing of the testimony submitted as to the peculiar bargaining weaknesses of women. Chief Justice
Hughes, in his dissent, acknowledged the data submitted from the reports of the Women's Bureau of the United States Department of Labor
showing discrepancies in the earnings of men and women performing
identical work, the unorganized state of working women and the relative
weakness in their bargaining power. He mentioned further the data from
the New York State Department of Labor and the Emergency Relief
Bureau of New York City on the burden upon taxpayers caused by the
failure to pay wages commensurate with value of services, and he found
the necessity for taking remedial measures "strikingly exhibited in the
brief filed by the Corporation Counsel of the City as an amicus curiae.' 'I9 °
In his judgment, the Court was "not at liberty to disregard these facts,"
but "must assume that they exist."'' x
A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.-The government
briefr92 maintained that the object of the N. I. R. A. was to relieve interstate commerce of obstructions caused by the depression. It presented
factual evidence of the great decline in prices, the downward spiral of
production and the fall in wages and employment, and it argued that a
reverse in this process was needed to stimulate recovery and prosperity.
It expressly stated that the emergency did not create a new Congressional
power but merely occasioned the use of the interstate commerce power
to relieve commerce of the tremendous burdens and restrictions upon it,
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See Brief of Corporation

Counsel of New York City as amkus curiae, in Case No. 838,

Oct. Term 1935, at 2-13.
169 See Brief of Def. in Error in Case No. 838, Oct. Terni 1935, at 1o-13.
'90 298 U.S.

587, 627 (1936).
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See Brief for Def. in Error in Cases Nos. 854 and 864, Oct. Term 1934, at 30-93 and
appendix.
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and that without federal action, the burdens and restrictions could not
be lifted. The Schechter brief cited a Brookings Institute report to prove
that the N.R.A. did not promote prosperity by raising wages before prices.
The Court held that the grave national crisis did not create or enlarge
constitutional powers and therefore did not authorize the effort to fix
hours and wages.
The government's theory that the live poultry code came within interstate commerce rested on the facts that the New York poultry market
imported nearly all of its fowl from other states and set prices for markets
in other states, and that all of the fair trade practices in the code, as well
as the setting of minimum wages and maximum hours, promoted stability
of prices which in turn facilitated the free flow of commerce. The relationship of the New York market to prices in other states was indicated
by tables and charts. The labor provisions were also linked with interstate commerce by statistics from government reports and economic texts
on the number of strikes due to wage and hour disputes and the loss of
commerce resulting therefrom. The brief for Schechter13 stressed the fact
that the activities regulated were intrastate activities, and it attacked
the government's theory of Congressional control over acts "affecting"
interstate commerce by observing that the logical consequence of such a
theory was a planned economy which would destroy our theory of government.
The Court accepted the view that the transactions regulated by the
code were intrastate on the ground that the poultry, though imported,
had been commingled with the mass of property within the state and had
come to rest. The Court argued that if wages and hours could be held
to affect interstate commerce because of their effect upon prices, so could
all other items of cost, and everything in industry would be subject to
the interstate commerce power.
On the problem of the proper delegation of legislative power, the argument was almost entirely legal. The Court held that the legislative policy
to rehabilitate industry and to promote recovery was too vague and that
the standard of "fair competition" was not known to the law as were the
standards of "unfair trade" and "public convenience and necessity." The
delegation of law-making powers to voluntary trade associations was held
inconsistent with the duties of Congress and the delegation of such powers
to the President was inadequate because of the lack of definite standards
and the failure to require sufficient findings.
Carter v. CarterCoal Co.-Economic data were utilized throughout the
193See
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course of this case. In its first pleading, 194 the government made a separate defense of economic facts relating to the amount of coal shipped and
used in interstate commerce, the depression of the coal industry, the effect
of cut-throat competition upon wages and the obstruction of commerce
by strikes. At the trial of the case, the government introduced a great
deal of expert testimony, supported by references to many economic
studies and government reports, on the facts alleged in this answer. The
coal operators, on their part, introduced additional expert testimony similarly supported by the experiences and studies of the industry.
The briefs of the coal operators95 and the governmentV9 6 engaged in
an economic debate over the nature of the industry's ills and the reasonableness of the proposed remedies. The non-legal, yet technical, character of this discussion can be observed from the manner in which they
dealt with certain questions of fact. (a) Was the industry suffering from
chaotic competition? The government attributed the industry's condition to multiple causes-inelasticity of demand, high proportion of wage
costs with wage cutting as the chief form of competition, high costs of
shutting down uneconomical mines, planless production-all calling for
the regulation proposed. The operators attributed its condition basically
to overcapacity which was unaffected by the proposed controls. (b) Were
the low prices and wages a sign of demoralization in the industry? The
operators claimed they were a normal readjustment from the abnormally
high war and post-war prices and wages. The government rebutted this
view by criticizing the statistics upon which it was based, claiming that
the operators erred in such ways as using a wholesale price index of all
commodities instead of a cost of living index and comparing wage rates
in one industry with earnings in another. (c) Was the movement of business from the North to the South a dislocation of commerce? The government claimed it was because it was accompanied by wage cutting, price
cutting, stoppages and shut-downs. The operators claimed it was not
because the total amount of commerce was undiminished and the shift
represented the normal flow of business from one operator to another due
to competition. (d) Did labor disputes obstruct interstate commerce?
The government cited the strikes of 19o6, 19o8, 191O, 1912, 1919, 1922

and

1927.

It told of the 169,ooo on strike in eight states in

1927

and of

the drop in coal shipments in Illinois from ten million tons a month to
a negligible quantity. It explained the stoppages in 1928 and 1932 pend'94
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ing the settlement of disputes in unorganized areas as chronic stoppages
to be expected as long as part of the industry remained unorganized and
refused to bargain collectively. The operators argued that in all the labor
disputes between 1924 and 1933 there was a loss of only nine to ten days
per man per year and that at no time since 1922 had consumers been
forced to go without coal as a result of a strike. (e) Were the bituminous
coal operators engaged in interstate commerce? The government showed
that approximately eighty-five per cent of the coal was consumed in states
other than those in which it was mined. The operators showed that
forty-two per cent of the coal was sold locally, that many producers were
engaged exclusively in local trade and that mining itself was a local proc97
ess separable from the transportation of coal.1
The majority court alluded to these facts only incidentally. It defined
interstate commerce as "intercourse for the purpose of trade" and held
mining to be intercourse for the purposes of production rather than
trade. Controversies over labor relations were local controversies over
local ills. "Such effect as they may have upon commerce, however extensive it may be, is secondary and indirect."' 98 The mandatory imposition
of hours and wages by a contract between a majority of producers and
a majority of labor representatives upon a dissentient minority was found
to be an improper delegation of legislative authority to private persons to
regulate the business of their competitors. This was deemed an intolerable and unconstitutional interference with personal liberty and private
property.
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.-Nofactual brief was filed in this case.
The majority court noted this, but held "there is no reason to doubt that
the State of Washington has encountered the same social problem as
elsewhere."'' 99 The Court revealed a thorough acquaintance with all data
submitted through such briefs in former cases and with "recent economic
experience."
We may take judicial notice of the unparalleled demands for relief which rose durig the recent period of depression and still continue to an alarming extent despite the
degree of economic recovery which has been achieved. It is unnecessary to cite official
statistics to establish what is of common knowledge through the length and breadth
of the land.- °
x97 Briefs filed by amid curiae merely augmented the dispute with similar evidence. The
briefs for the States of Ohio, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Washington, Kentucky and New Mexico
raised the cry that they were helpless to regulate the industry in their separate jurisdictions,
and needed the federal act to save their coal producers from disastrous competition.
1gS298 U.S. 238, 309 (1936).
x99300 U.S. 379, 399 (i937).

20oId. at 399.
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Such statistics, however, had been before the court in the Morehead
case and were again before it in the pending social security cases.2 0 On
the basis of such information, the Court interpreted the minimum wage
law as an effort on the part of the community to avoid giving a subsidy
to unconscionable employers. The other reasons for upholding the law
as a reasonable exercise of police power it found in the minority opinions
of the Adkins case.
The enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 has presented
a number of new issues with respect to the power of Congress to set
minimum wages for both men and women in industries producing goods
for interstate commerce. Although the personnel of the Supreme Court
has recently been changed and the interstate commerce power of Congress
has been broadly interpreted, these are merely auspicious circumstances
for the consideration of the social implications of the new law. It may be
relatively simple to demonstrate that the wage and hour law has a reasonable relationship to the health of male workers, the harmonious functioning of industry and the general welfare of the community. Such a factual
brief has been prepared for hours laws for men, and just as was done for
the laws on women, the material may be revised to show the reasonableness of wage laws for men. It may be more difficult to demonstrate the
proximate relationship between the regulation of wages and interstate
commerce. The reasoning of the National Labor Relations Act cases may
be relied upon in a factual showing of the interruptions to interstate commerce due to industrial strife over wages. Far more strikes have been
caused by disputes over wages than by struggles over the right to bargain
collectively. The interstate ramifications of specific industries and the
effect of stoppages in production upon interstate commerce can be presented as graphically for wage arguments as they have been for bargaining disputes in the National Labor Relations Act cases.
It is possible, however, that the occasion of the Fair Labor Standards
Act before a liberal court may be taken to obtain a broader conception
X
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of the commerce power of Congress. At least with respect to the shipment of goods and the transmission of information in the channels of
interstate commerce, it may be argued that the power of Congress is
plenary so that the physical shipment or transmission may be prohibited
on the basis of any standard deemed reasonably related to the public welfare. That standard may be local or international, a matter of production or a matter of trade, a quality of the goods transported or an intangible public policy; it need not bear any causal relationship to interstate commerce as long as it is applied only in the realm of interstate commerce. To maintain such an interpretation of the commerce power of
Congress, it may be helpful to present factual material on the "economic
conditions which have supervened ''2 °2 since the adoption of the constitution and the formulation of the early judicial decisions on the commerce
power. Those conditions include the increasing interdependence of the
various parts of our country, the increasing unity of certain aspects of
our economy, the increasing tendency of business to form interstate combinations and the increasing federal assumption of the burdens of "local"
relief, social security, employment, rural rehabilitation, and the conservation of natural resources. It may be that those conditions have been in
existence for some time, but the realization of them has "supervened"
the consciousness of our people only recently. The liberal Supreme Court
may take judicial notice of such data if they are presented fully enough
to appear to be common knowledge or if they are revealed to be the factors
that Congress reasonably considered in the enactment of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. On the basis of such data, the Supreme Court may uphold
the Act and propound the plenary power of Congress over interstate
commerce.
This review of the use of economic data in labor cases has been limited
to the briefs and recorded arguments before the United States Supreme
Court and has been confined to civil actions and substantive or jurisdictional issues. It may well be that in criminal cases or cases involving
procedural matters economic data may have less utility. It is not true,
however, that the usefulness of such data is confined to cases at the level
of the Supreme Court or to appellate briefs. In the Carter Coal Co. case,
the essential facts were alleged in the initial pleading. In the National
Labor Relations Act cases, the economic data were presented at the first
administrative hearing. In the Muller case, the interpretative material
was presented for the first time before the Supreme Court merely because
- West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 3oo U.S, 379, 390 (1937),
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the case arose on demurrer. In order to take advantage of the protective
presumptions that accompany the findings of the lower courts, it would
appear to be prudent to introduce economic data at the earliest possible
moment.
The form in which economic data have been presented has varied.
The Brandeis-Frankfurter-Goldmark briefs were factual briefs appended
to legal briefs and this dual form has been adopted by many attorneys.
The National Labor Relations Board briefs, however, integrated the economic data into the legal argument in one brief. This has been the most
common form since most briefs have not had enough economic data for
separate treatment. The Carter Coal Co. briefs had both a special section
devoted to the facual defense and an admixture of economic data with
the legal material. The relative merits of these forms depend probably
upon the assimilability of the economic data in the legal argument.
The nature of the economic data introduced has also varied widely.
It has grown in complexity from the simple references to common knowledge in the Holden case to the great compilation of world experience in
the Muller case. It has risen in authority from the few industry monographs in the Lochner case to the many government and scientific research
reports in the Carter Coal Co. case. It has ranged in formidability from
the unsupported assertions of fact in the Senn case to the elaborately
documented argumentation in the Jones and Laughlin case. From the
time of the early labor cases at the end of the last century to the present
time, economic research, particularly in the field of labor problems, has
expanded tremendously and this development has been reflected in the
economic data used in labor cases.
The effect of the economic data reported above is most difficult to
appraise. For want of a device to read the minds of judges, it is impossible
to declare dogmatically that certain data were responsible for certain decisions. The Supreme Court opinions bear many grateful acknowledgments of the economic data submitted and it seems certain that no
cause has been penalized for the introduction of such data whereas
many causes have been helped. In those cases above in which one
party used economic data and the other failed to or used it only incidentally, victory went to the former sixteen o 3 times and to the latter
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only three2° 4 times. This may have been sheer coincidence, but it strongly
suggests a causal relationship. A more intimate examination of the
record corroborates the conclusion that the use of economic data has been
effective in labor cases.
The use of economic data seems well assured for the future. As long
as courts seek the reasonableness of legislation in a changing economic
order, as long as laws require an effect upon interstate commerce or as
long as attorneys must prove an intent to accomplish an economic objective, there will remain a need for economic data.
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